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A Game Form Model of a Dynamic Multipolar International Conflict
among Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–9
Bjorn Ebbesen
Abstract
Inspired by the article Economic constraints, strategic stability and arms reduc-
tion by A. Halperin and I. Amit, we derive an n-dimensional array of nonlinear
differential equations, reflecting trade among and growth of national economics and
use and growth of national military power. Constraints and assumptions are used
in an axiomatic manner to derive new functions (economics) or to ensure the ap-
plicability of existing military models (Lanchester). Definition and change of payoff
functions and solution concepts for this game form allows us to investigate the dy-
namics of multipolar systems of interacting nations in terms of trade and conflicts.
The final application compares two scenarios of international economic cooperation
in the form of just distribution of commonly organized growth of economic potential.
The scenarios differ in the consideration of military power in negotiations. In the
first scenario the threat of possible use of military power is not taken into account,
whereas such threatening is considered in the second scenario. A time-consistent,
cooperative, non-transferable-utility-based solution concept is derived and used.
An Infiltration Game on a Circumference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11–16
Andrej Yu. Garnaev and Galina Yu. Garnaeva
Abstract
An Infiltrator, starting at a safe base, tries to pass unhit by the Guard, having
a gun, to a safe destination within a time limit. There is a restriction on the
number of the Guard’s shorts. A discrete variant of this zero-sum game on a circle
is investigated. The optimal strategies are obtained.
An Approach to Defining Solution Concept in N-Person Nonantagonistic
Positional Differential Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17–26
Anatoly F. Kleimenov
Abstract
One of the basic problems in nonantogonistic positional differential games (NPDGs)
theory is the defining of solution concept. Usually, some principle of optimality gives
the basis for the solution concept, and the latter is generally based on some addi-
tional assumptions. In the paper we try to formalize these additional assumptions
so that the choice of concrete solution type can be made on formal basis. An-
other basic problem in NPDG is choosing a unique representative among multiple
solutions of one and the same type. In the paper we introduce two new types of
solutions in NPDG: one for the class of closed-loop strategies and the other for the
class of feedback strategies. The construction of these solutions essentially employs
the marginal control possibilities of all players in NPDG.
The Simple Pursuit by a Few Objects on the Multidimensional
Sphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27–36
Alexander M. Kovshov
Abstract
This paper makes an attempt to study pursuit games on non-linear manifolds.
Discussing this questions we use the terminology given by L. A. Petrosjan (Π-
strategy). On the sphere there are two strategies corresponding to the linear Π-
strategy. They are Π1-strategy and Π2-strategy:
Π1-strategy prescribes the pursuer to move toward the fixed point named “the
center of pursuit” along a geodesic line;
Π2-strategy conserves the players’ relative positions an accuracy distance.
This paper shows that Π2-strategy is successful in the problem of simple pursuit
on the sphere with a general starting position.
Dynamic Games with Optimal Stopping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37–45
Vladimir F. Mazalov
Abstract
We consider the games G(x, p,N,K), based upon the following form. Imag-
ine two objects in a line (for instance, two yachts) with a distance between them
equalling x. For the sake of certainty determine x1 as the position of object 1 and x2
- the position of object 2; x1−x2 = x. The objects move on a line Ox, with random
leaps. Every step players may observe N independent identically distributed ran-
dom variables from their sequences y
(1)




1 , ..., y
(2)
N with the continuous
distribution function F (x) and density p(x), x ∈ R. The observations continue one
after another.Each player may stop them at a random point in time t, being the
strategy of a player in this game. The selection of value yt results in the random
leap of an object on the k-step. This procedure may be considered to be a choice
based upon the activity of the wind in the yachting illustration. A player wins if
his object has advanced farther for K steps than his opponent, k ≥ 1.
On Two Person Full-Information Best Choice Problem with Imperfect
Observation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47–55
Peter Neumann, Zdzislaw Porosinski and Krzystof Szajowski
Abstract
The paper deals with the following zero-sum game version of the full-information
best choice problem. Two decision makers, Player 1 and Player 2, observe sequen-
tially a known number N of iid random variables from a known continuous dis-
tribution with the object of choosing the largest. The random variables cannot be
perfectly observed. Each time a random variable is sampled the sampler is informed
only whether it is greater than or less than some level specified by him. Each of
the players can choose at most one observation. After each sampling players take a
decision for acceptance or rejection of the observation. If both want to accept the
same observation the priority is given to a specified player, say Player 1. The class
of adequate strategies and the suitable gain function for the problem is constructed.
In the finite horizon case that the game has solution in pure strategies. A numerical
examples are given. A random number of observations is also investigated. For
the geometric N , the equilibrium strategy for Player 1 depends on parameter p of
geometric distribution, but it is always pure one. The form of the second Player’s
strategy depends on parameter p. It is pure for large value of p and is a mixture of
two pure strategies.
Stochastic Strategies in Differential Games with Incomplete
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57–63
Tatyana V. Slobodinskaya
Abstract
In the paper we consider the simple pursuit zero-sum game with incomplete
information and prescribed duration on the plane between the team of pursuers
and the team of evaders. In contrast with the pure piecewise constant strategy of
the player, we define the stochastic piecewise constant strategy. We formulate the
conditions, upon which the epsilon-optimal (SPCS) may be effectively constructed.
We also provide two examples of differential zero-sum pursuit-evasion games of
prescribed duration with delayed information for both players.
Dynamic Pursuit Game Dip Sonor and Its Computerization . . . . . 65–69
Igor L. Bratchikov
Abstract
In the paper we consider the game DIP SONOR, invented at Yakutsk State
University in the late 1980s. This is a positional game between two players: a
team of evaders and a pursuer. We present a mathematical model of the game as
well as the computerization of it that had been undertaken at St.-Petersburg State
University. We briefly describe two possible strategies for the pursuer and outline
the future extensions of the programming system.
Some Game-Theoretical Models of Conflict in Finance . . . . . . . . . . 71–78
Vladimir M. Bure and Oleg A. Malafeyev
Abstract
Two game-theoretical models of conflict in finance are considered in the paper.
The first model gives approach to the solving of a pricing problem. The second
model is concerned of a problem of repeated partnerships.
On the Existence of the Coalition Set Core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79–86
Alexander A. Vasin and Vladimir A. Gurvich
Abstract
The paper considers cooperative games with a given set of admissible coalitions
(a coalition set) and superadditive payoff functions. A coalition set is called concil-
iable if the coalition set core is non-empty for every game of this class. We employ
the concept of a balanced set of coalitions (Bondareva, 1963, Shapley, 1964) in order
to characterize the conciliable sets. We show that a coalition set is conciliable if and
only if every minimal balanced collection included in this set is a partition of the
set of players. Similar results are established for set-valued characteristic function
and normal form games. The paper discusses several concrete types of conciliable
coalition sets.
Evolution and Game-Theoretic Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87–101
Jorgen W. Weibull
Abstract
The usual justifications of non-cooperative solution criteria are rationalistic in
nature, building on individual rationality and expectation-coordination postulates.
In contrast, the ”as if” approach to game-theoretic rationality is evolutionary, ar-
guing that even if strategically interacting agents do not meet these epistemic con-
ditions, their long-run aggregate behavior will nevertheless conform with them, be-
cause of the workings of biological, social or cognitive selection processes. The
present essay discusses three implications of evolutionary selection dynamics in
favour of game-theoretic rationality and four potential obstacles to the general va-
lidity of these implications.
A Differential Game Model for Optimal Price Subsidy of New Technolo-
gies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103–114
Georges Zaccour
Abstract
We consider a differential game model to investigate the effects of price subsidy
over time on the rate of diffusion of a new technology. We assume that the latter
is produced by a monopolist whose objective is to maximize his profit stream over
the planning horizon [0, T ]. The government seeks to maximize the total number
of installations by time T . The motivation of the government’s behaviour is the
existence of a net societal benefit in accelerating the diffusion of the new technology.
The assumption of a monopolistic market structure stems from patent protection,
for instance. The firm controls the price and the government the subsidy rate. It is
shown that the timepaths of demand, subsidy, government spending rate and price
depend on some product characteristics and cost structure.
Constructions of Nonsmooth Analysis in Numerical Methods for Solving
Hamilton-Jacobi Equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115–131
Svetlana V. Grigorjeva, Alexander A. Tarasjev, Vladimir N. Ushakov and Alexan-
der A. Uspenskii
Abstract
In the paper, finite difference operators (FDO) and approximation schemes (AS)
for constructing generalized solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi equations (HJE) with non-
convex Hamiltonians are proposed. These constructions are based on results of
optimal guaranteed control theory, convex and non-smooth analysis and develop the
results on the theory of positional differential games by Krasovski? and Subbotin.
The Distribution of Voting Power in the UN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133–141
William Kerby and Frank Gobeler
Abstract
The intention of this paper is to make a contribution to the discussion of the
reform proposals based on a power index analysis (PIA). PIA is applied to the
present UNO. The reform proposals of a few member states are analysed and a
proposal of the authors is introduced.
Multiple Search Game with Nonmovable Hyder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143–151
Teturo Kamae
Abstract
In the paper we describe a generalization of the multiple search game in contin-
uous search time. We consider three zero-sum games: multiple search game without
duplication, multiple search game with duplication and multistage search game. We
state and prove theorems describing optimal strategies in the three games.
Game Theoretical Model of Harvesting Two Species of Fish . . 153–159
Ekaterina Kunshenko and Viktor Zakharov
Abstract
In this paper we apply method of regularization of the Stackelberg differential
game which construct mechanism of payments in the conflict model of harvesting
two species by two agents.
Game with Optimal Stopping of Random Walks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161–168
Vladimir V. Mazalov
Abstract
Let us consider a game Γ of two persons, defined on random walks of the following
form. Let xn and yn are symmetric random walks at the set E = {0, 1, ..., k},
beginning in the states a and b from E respectively and absorbing at its ends.
Players I and II observe for random walks xn and yn and stop them at some moments
of time τ and σ. These random variables τ and σ, which we shall suppose to be
stopping times, are the players’ strategies. Then if xτ > yσ, player I wins; if xτ < yσ
- player II. But if xτ = yσ, draw is announced. There is no any information about
the opponent’s behavior at players’ disposal. The situation of equilibrium is sought
in such game.
Game with Several Pursuers and One Evader with Discrete
Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169–184
Arik Melikyan and Odile Pourtallier
Abstract
The paper presents games with several pursuers and one evader. We consider
both cases with the fixed final time, or the game of encounter, and with the non-
fixed final time, that is the game of pursuit-evasion. We focus on the situation
where the pursuers have obsrvation about the state of the system only at discrete
time instants. Two corresponding differential games are formulated with one evader
and several pursuers, each pursuer having his own maximal speed and capture ra-
dius. A problem is stated to find for a given initial time and position the next
observation instant up to which the observation can be omitted without any loss in
cost-function. Geometrical algorithm of the problem solution is suggested, which
gives for several specific cases an explicit solution and the set of necessary discrete
observation moments. The methodology is based on comparison between discrete
observations and continuous observation.
Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185–191
Leon A. Petrosjan and Tamaki Tanaka
Abstract
A multistage zero sum two person game with vector payoff is considered. The
problem of time consistency and strongly time consistency of optimality principle
in this game is investigated. It is proved that the set of all saddle points in any
multistage game is a time consistent optimality principle. A counterexample for
strongly time consistency is considered. A saddle point, which is not a strongly
time consistent, is constructed in this example. The paper also deals with the
repeated games with vector payoffs. It is shown that the set of all saddle points in
any repeated game is a strongly time consistent optimality principle.
Contraction of Attainability Domains in a Game of Pursuit . . . 193–207
Sergey E. Miheev
Abstract
A game of pursuit on the plane with phase constraints is considered. The dy-
namics of the pursuer and the evader is described by a system of simple motion
equations. The pursuer constructs his control on the base of information about
his own state, and the state and velocity of the evader. The evader knows only
the positions of the pursuer. A pursuit strategy based on attainability domains of
the evader is proposed. Properties of connectedness type are introduced for the
set of phase constraints. These properties provide construction of the attainability
domains for motions governed by the proposed pursuit strategy and guarantee a
successful pursuit.
A Game Theoretic Model of the Decision-Making Process within Inter-
national Economic Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
209–219
Bernard Gauthier and Leon A. Petrosjan
Abstract
This study proposes a game-theoretical model for analysing decision-making
within International Economic Organizations (IEO). The model is based upon the
relationship linking member countries, the IEO president, the international bureau-
cracy and recipient countries within the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund policy-making processes. The optimal conditions selected by the players given
the hierarchical structure of delegation are presented. The outcome of the game is
a Nash equilibrium under which no actor has an interest in deviating from the so-
lution. The approach is unique in that the solution is found through equilibrium
in an auxiliary subgame between the member countries. Previous model presented
Romboid structure in the framework of Petrosjan and Danilov (1986). However, this
model innovates in the number of the hierarchic levels, and number of the players.
